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Abstract 
This article explores the integration of the European Union (EU) as an institution after the 2015-
2016 migrant crisis. Qualitative data from elite interviews in Brussels and policy analysis, in the 
framework of a bigger project about the impact of the migrant crisis on European integration, 
highlight the EU learning about new integration modes as a key theme following the crisis. The 
article focuses on this theme and argues that EU integration has been happening through 
intensive learning after the-migrant crisis, whereby the EU has been exploring a combination of 
certain integration modes: shaping the relationships with candidate countries by restraining from 
enlargement; shaping the relationships with (prospectively) exiting Member States by 
considering fuzziness at the borders; exploring differentiation among the existing Member 
States, possibly through promoting a two-tier EU, instead of universal deepening. A key 
contribution lies in applying the notion ‘learning’ to understanding EU integration modes 
specifically after the migrant crisis.   
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1. Introduction  
What the EU learned about its integration from the migrant crisis is the subject of this article. 
‘Migrant crisis’ is a complex and value-laden term. It is a migrant crisis because the EU 
experienced a dramatic increase in irregular crossing of its external borders between 2015-2016 
(EC 2017). Those entering were fleeing military conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as 
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poverty and political uncertainty elsewhere. Termed variously the ‘refugee crisis’ (Khiabany 
2016: 755), the ‘migrant crisis’ (Balkan 2016: 118), the ‘refugee and migrant crisis’  (Karolewski 
and Benedikter 2017: 294), we operate with the term ‘migrant crisis’ because it is broad enough 
to embrace different flows of migrants into Europe that, albeit prompted by partly different 
drivers, raise overlapping concerns and reactions. By using the term ‘migrant crisis’ we do not 
wish to invisibilise refugees, but rather to acknowledge the overlaps between different facets of 
migration in the EU that are referred to as ‘mixed flows’ (Pastore and Henry 2016: 44). We 
understand the ‘migrant crisis’ as being located at the intersection of various ‘crises’ (economic, 
social, security, Schengen, etc.) (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2018).  We acknowledge that the 
challenges related to the ‘migrant crisis’ are far from being solved. This was apparent, for 
instance, in the events leading up to the EU summit of June 2018 and the ongoing political 
divisions that the summit revealed, including about ‘burden sharing’ (European Council 2018). 
The sense of emergency present in the EU in 2015-2016, however, has dissipated. Our research 
participants, introduced below, were unanimous in stating that the ‘crisis’ is no longer present, 
but we do still experience its repercussions; a view recently shared by the First Vice-President of 
the European Commission, Frans Timmermans (European Commission Press Release Database 
2019).  
The migrant crisis challenged the EU project at the core, questioning prospects of further EU 
integration.  We understand EU integration broadly as both seeking ways to structure and 
strengthen the relationships among the existing and (possibly) exiting Member States (MSs) and 
widening to include new MSs; processes referred to as deepening and widening (La Barbera 
2015).  
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The article sets out to answer the question: What modes of integration has the EU learned from 
the migrant crisis? The article argues that the migrant crisis triggered intensive learning in the EU 
about its integration modes, and that EU integration is happening through learning whereby the 
EU has been exploring a combination of certain modes of integration. The article begins by 
reviewing two bodies of literature: organisational learning in the EU and EU integration after the 
migrant crisis. Then, after detailing our methodological approach, the article shows how the 
‘crisis’ served as a ‘tipping point’ for a change of EU priorities as it has placed migration at the 
centre of its policy-making. Here, empirical findings relating to three interconnected modes of 
integration are explored: reducing enthusiasm for further enlargement; shaping the relationships 
with (possibly) exiting MSs by considering fuzziness at the borders with the UK post-Brexit; and 
seeking differentiation among the existing MSs possibly through promoting a two-tier EU instead 
of universal deepening.  
 
The article strengthens the link between, and contributes to, two bodies of literature: 
organisational learning in the EU and EU integration particularly after the migrant crisis. The 
article highlights the centrality of learning in the EU integration process, especially following the 
migrant crisis; it intersects organisational learning theory and theoretical approaches to EU 
integration.  
 
2. Towards conceptualizing EU integration in relation to learning  
This section locates our research at the crossway of two bodies of literature: organisational 
learning in the EU and EU integration after the migrant crisis (Figure 1). , This literature review 
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also builds a framework for analyzing EU integration after the migrant crisis from the perspective 
of organisational learning. 
(figure 1 here) 
2.1. EU integration after the migrant crisis 
A significant theme in debates around EU integration after 2015 revolves around the implications 
of the migrant crisis for the EU’s existence. Literature points to multiple problematisations of the 
crisis (Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017), and the link between the migrant crisis and other 
recent and ongoing crises in Europe, such as the Global Financial Crisis, the Eurozone crisis and 
the security crisis (Falkner 2016; Balkan 2016; Seabrooke and Tsingou 2018). It also highlights 
how the migrant crisis interacted with other crises, such as that of the Eurozone, to produce new 
problems, including rising Euroscepticism (Taggrat and Szczerbiak 2018).  
Combined, these problems put EU integration into question (Murray and Longo 2018; Wolf and 
Ossewaarde 2018) to the point that some analysts (Jones 2018; Morsut and Kruke 2018) identify 
a reverse process – disintegration. Crises are not new in the EU, and indeed, they are integral to 
a cyclical process of EU integration (Scipioni 2017). Previous crises, however, eventually drove 
further integration. Current crises are seen as threatening the EU project (Seabrooke and Tsingou 
2018), with MSs advocating the re-nationalisation of policies, including migration policies (Brekke 
and Staver 2018). 
Post-migrant crisis literature also addresses the theorization of EU integration, drawing on 
existing theories: institutionalism (Jones 2018), intergovernmentalism (Jones 2018), new 
intergovernmentalism (Falkner 2016), liberal intergovernmentalism (Borzel and Risse 2018), 
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functionalism (Borzel and Risse 2018), neofunctionalism (Borzel and Risse 2018), 
postfunctionalism (Schimmelfennig 2018), transactionalism and new supranationalism (Falkner 
2016).  
There is no consensus as to what theoretical approaches are dominant in the recent context. 
While Falkner (2016) claims that new supranationalism may be developing, new 
intergovernmentalism will potentially dominate in EU integration, Borzel and Risse (2018),  
maintain that liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and postfunctionalism have 
become the dominant theoretical approaches.  
None of the above theoretical approaches can fully explain the integration trajectories adopted 
following different crises in the EU. For example, Borzel and Risse (2018) argue that none of the 
dominant approaches account for why the Euro crisis resulted in the substantial deepening of 
European fiscal and financial integration while MSs preferred disintegration when it came to 
dealing with the migrant crisis.  
A final, related body of literature written after the migrant crisis discusses modes of EU 
integration, that is, patterns of relationships among the MSs and among the MSs and the 
candidate countries. Pre-migrant-crisis literature captures a range of these modes. The 
relationships among the MSs are linked to differentiated integration. Stubb (1996: 283) states, 
‘[T]he debate about differentiated integration… is characterised by an excess of terminology 
which can give even the most experienced specialist of European integration a severe case of 
semantic indigestion’. The multiplicity of routes for differentiated integration has been debated 
more recently by Antoniolli (2019) and Schimmelfennig and Winzen (2019). The relationships 
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between the MSs and EU candidate countries are discussed in terms of the 
advantages/disadvantages of enlargement for the EU (Sjursen 2006; Grabbe 2014). Post-migrant-
crisis literature focuses on the relationships among the MSs. For example, Panizzon and Van 
Riemsdijk (2018) discuss the benefits of multi-level governance in managing the migrant crisis 
and its aftermath. Morsut and Kruke (2018) meanwhile present their own typology of the modes 
and argue that the EU should use a mix of self-governance, co-governance and hierarchical 
governance to govern the post-migrant-crisis context so as not to endanger the EU integration 
project. 
The multiple foci and theoretical perspectives in the literature on EU integration point to the 
difficulty of finding a single theoretical framework for the analysis of EU integration after the 
migrant crisis. Indeed, it had not been much easier prior to the crisis, as according to Hooghe and 
Marks (2008: 39), ‘European integration has thrown up a series of facts that escape the theories 
on offer’.  
2.2. Organisational learning in the EU 
Literature points to the potential importance of organisational learning in the analysis of the work 
of the EU in general. In particular, Radaelli and Dunlop (2013: 923) state that ‘[T]he European 
Union may well be a learning organisation’, and learning is ‘one of the promising frameworks’ for 
the analysis of the EU. This may, arguably, be applied to the case of EU integration, as explained 
in this sub-section, which provides an overview of the literature on organisational learning in the 
EU; a literature based on a wider body of scholarship on organisation learning (e.g., Wang and 
Ahmed 2003). This sub-section also explores the definition of organisation learning.  
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According to Radaelli and Dunlop (2013: 923), ‘[I]n public policy analysis, learning is often defined 
as a process of updating beliefs about policy based on lived or witnessed experiences, analysis or 
social interaction’. The term ‘organisational learning’ is similar to the term ‘institutional learning’, 
but the latter is usually used in research in the field of education (Hale 2017; Foutz and Emmons 
2017). Understanding organisational learning as updating beliefs about policy is the first step in 
exploring the definition of this key term. It is also important to understand how learning and 
change are connected, and that different types of learning exist.  
Learning in the EU may have tipping moments of change as well as moments of low degree of 
learning, with crises usually being the triggering factors of learning (Radaelli and Dunlop 2013). 
While most studies understand change as following learning (e.g., Radaelli and Dunlop 2013; 
Seabrooke and Tsingou 2018), Kamkhaji and Radaelli (2017) suggest the reverse: policy learning 
follows change. Aside from this, learning usually presupposes advancing knowledge in new ways, 
but it may also be about ‘unlearning old lessons’ (Zito and Schout 2009: 1111). 
The most common typologies of learning discussed in the literature about EU organisational 
learning include single- and double-loop learning (Argyris and Schon 1978) and triple-loop 
learning (Flood and Romm 2018). Single-loop learning is instrumental, focused on changing 
particular actions, and does not presuppose altering the fundamental values of the organisation 
(Arguis and Schon 1978). In Kamkhaji and Radaelli’s (2017) terms, it does not even lead to policy 
changes as the scholars talk about single-loop learning and policy change as two separate issues. 
Double-loop learning is about a value change resulting from feedback from learning, which 
fundamentally transforms organisational behaviour (Arguis and Schon 1978). Triple-loop learning 
is the most reflexive and transforming learning sub-process as it leads to the reevaluation of the 
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context in which the organisation operates, fundamental change of power relations within the 
organisation and between it and other organisations, and a change in how the organisation 
decides what is right for it to do (Flood and Romm 2018). Tosey et al (2012: 291), however, 
critique the term, stating that ‘conceptualizations of triple-loop learning are diverse, often have 
little theoretical rooting, are sometimes driven by normative considerations, and lack support 
from empirical research’. 
In this sense, the article by Zito and Schout (2009) is the closest conceptually to our research. 
That article is a milestone in bringing together the debates about EU integration and learning. 
While Zito and Schout’s study aims at evidencing learning in the EU at the micro level in terms of 
individuals and their social interactions, our research deals with the macro level because it 
considers the learning of the EU as an institution. Also, we look at a specific period – after the 
migrant crisis, and we are specifically interested in the modes of integration in this period.   
. The apparent gap in this literature is in applying the notion of learning to EU integration 
specifically in the post-migrant-crisis context. Our research addresses this gap. ,  
3. Methods 
The data informing this article were collected in the framework of a larger project focused on 
developing understanding of the impact for EU integration of the migrant crisis along the Balkan 
route. Although we did not set out to research it, organisational learning of the EU about its 
integration after the migrant crisis emerged as a key theme in the data, and it forms the focus of 
the current article, which pertains to the EU more broadly rather than the Balkan route 
specifically.  
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The larger project, in the framework of which this article was developed, was a qualitative study, 
consisting of policy analysis and elite interviews with EU-level decision-makers in Brussels. Prior 
popular discourse analysis based on the online search of relevant articles in media outlets was 
used to inform the interviews and policy document search. 
We received ethical approval from the University of Sheffield Ethics Committee for conducting 
interviews. In total, 16 semi-structured elite interviews were conducted in Brussels. The majority 
of the interviewees represented EU level decision-making bodies. Most of these voices are from 
the European Commission (EC) –civil servants whose primary responsibility is to develop and 
execute the implementation of the ideas devised by legislative bodies, such as the European 
Parliament (EP). In addition, two MEPs were interviewed. The remaining interviewees were 
researchers or policy analysts representing NGOs or think tanks whose voices were part of the 
political debates because they informed and evaluated policy-making. The affiliations as narrow 
or broad as chosen by the interviewees are presented in the appendix. Understanding the nature 
of the voices of these people working in the EU institutions or other relevant NGOS and think 
tanks is important as it is fundamental to understanding who learns in the EU. We were 
interested in these people’s perspectives as they have opinions about the modes of EU 
integration in the post-migrant-crisis context, and their work at the frontline of policy-making has 
an impact on EU integration.  
 
The sample of interviewees in the context of the larger project was purposeful. It was designed 
to capture knowledge in the wake of the migrant crisis related to EU internal and external 
migration (i.e. EU Freedom of Movement and third country economic migrants and refugees), 
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and knowledge linked to EU integration and Brexit. There was an element of snowballing in 
recruiting the participants. We recruited participants who could discuss all of these areas. We did 
not succeed in finding interviewees from Directorate European Neighborhood Policies and 
Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). Other interviewees, however, were sufficiently competent 
to comment on the questions linked to EU enlargement due to their prior experience working at 
DG NEAR, or their current cooperation with EU candidate countries. The interviews took place 
face-to face, with the exception of three, which were conducted over Skype and e-mail. The 
interviews were conducted between September and November, 2017. All the interviews relied 
on the same topic guide. The interviews were voice recorded, and transcribed manually. The 
transcripts were analysed thematically along with the responses of the interviewees who e-
mailed their answers. The anonymity of interviewees and the confidentiality of their answers was 
secured by leaving out participants’ names and assigning a code to each participant (1-16). The 
affiliation of the respondents was also omitted, with the exception of those who did not mind to 
reveal it. Their exact post in the organisation, however, was kept confidential.  
Policy document analysis was used to supplement the analysis of the interview findings. Policy 
documents provided further details about the ideas and processes that the interviewees 
discussed. Most of the policy documents were collected before the interviews took place to 
generate a timeline of the policy actions that the EU took to support migrants prior to the migrant 
crisis in 2015-2016, and later the policies that were produced to address the migrant crisis. We 
collected further documents after the interviews to address specific points raised by the 
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interviewees. The range of documents this article refers to is limited to five recent documents 
related to EU enlargement and the EU summit about migration1.  
We acknowledge that the variety of perspectives about the typology of organisational learning 
in scholarly debates depends on the challenges in studying organisational learning in all areas of 
the work of the EU. One of the difficulties is in the fact that ‘[C]oncepts of learning overlap, and 
there are difficulties in specifying whether or not learning has occurred given the many possible 
intervening variables’ (Zito and Schout 2009: 1104). Moreover, as Radaelli and Dunlop (2013: 
923) argue ‘…learning as a process is often problematic for social scientists. Researchers have 
found it easier to observe the products of learning’. There may be, however, a trap hidden in 
such a logic. It dismisses the possibility of gradually emerging products of learning being part and 
parcel of the learning process reinforcing and shaping in turn further learning. This article avoids 
striving to establish the boundary between the learning process and its products. This article also 
does not intend to offer a solution to the challenges of studying learning. Instead, it draws its 
hypothesis from Radaelli and Dunlop’s (2013) argument that ‘[T]he European Union may well be 
a learning organisation’, and learning is ‘one of the promising frameworks’ for the analysis of the 
EU. Based on this hypothesis, we aim to explore what modes of integration the EU has learned 
from the migrant crisis. 
 
                                                            
1 European Commission Roadmap on Migration (2017), Communication on EU Enlargement Policy 
(2018), EU Enlargement Factsheet (n.d.), European Commission Press Release Database (2018), Minutes 
on European Council on Migration (2018).  
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4. Learning in EU integration after the migrant crisis 
This section presents the research findings. It examines the learning in the EU that the migrant 
crisis triggered and what integration modes the EU has been exploring in this context.  
4.1. The migrant crisis as a trigger for intensive learning 
The language that the interviewees used conveys the idea that the migrant crisis has induced 
learning in the EU on different levels. Language such as ‘learning lessons’, ‘realising’, ‘figuring out’ 
is quite common, as illustrated by these exemplary quotes: 
‘On the EU level some lessons have been learned about how to react in a more structural way… 
We learned the lessons and put some mechanisms in force. They existed before but were not 
working’ (Interviewee 4, EU official). 
‘EU countries realised that they need to work more on EU multilateral level… They cannot operate 
alone. They need cooperation’ (Interviewee 14, official working on Strategy ‘European Migrant 
Smuggling Centre’ at Europol). 
‘They [MSs] are more open to think that more needs to be done together. There were countries 
that were sceptical. But there is realisation now’ (Interviewee 10, EU official). 
So what’s important for the EU, as far as I can see, is to figure out how to reform the EU, how to 
handle Poland and Hungary, what to do with countries building fences in Europe to prevent 
migration, how to deal with the political situation after the elections in Germany. These are the 
most important problems’ (Interviewee 3, MEP). 
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The idea that the migrant crisis has triggered learning in the EU as an institution and within its 
MSs is in line with the arguments about the potential of crises to induce learning, put forward in 
the literature on organisational learning in the EU (e.g., Kamkhaji and Radaelli 2017). While 
accepting Radaelli and Dunlop’s (2013) proposition that ‘[T]he European Union may well be a 
learning organisation’, we use the explicit references of the interviewees to learning presented 
above as a basis to recognize that EU integration in particular may be happening through 
learning, while looking at the period after the migrant crisis.  
 
4.2. EU integration through learning 
Researchers who study learning in organisations face many challenges, including recognizing 
whether what is observed is, in fact, learning, and where the boundary is between learning as a 
process and the outcomes of this process (Zito and Schout 2009). We have stated earlier that we 
do not intend to identify such a boundary, but rather rely on Radaelli and Dunlop’s (2013) 
argument that the EU may be a learning organisation and explore this in relation to EU integration 
specifically after the migrant crisis by evidencing the integration modes that the EU has learnt 
post-migrant-crisis. The quotes above suggest that the migrant crisis has triggered learning in 
different areas of functioning of the EU. In addition, we will illustrate that through the migrant 
crisis the EU as an institution learnt that EU integration progress had been ineffective, and that 
three new modes of integration have emerged as a result of this learning.  
It is obvious that the migrant crisis brought about challenges in EU integration by causing 
disagreements amongst the MSs. Moreover, the migrant crisis provoked EU officials to examine 
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EU integration in retrospect and re-evaluate it. They learnt that EU integration had been 
progressing ineffectively since it had not prepared the EU to deal with the migrant crisis more 
effectively when the problem arose: 
‘It raised questions about how united the EU was. These cracks existed before but this [migrant 
crisis] made them more visible’ (Interviewees 6, MEP). 
This is a very strong theme running through the interview data from different participants, 
including representatives from think tanks: 
‘The migrant crisis has been a testing ground for a number of political trends that had been 
developing over the last years. This was a perfect issue to have those trends crystallised and come 
forward. If we look at this Visegrad group and other Member States – this hasn’t been created by 
the migrant crisis. The issues had been there and the migrant crisis made them visible’ 
(Interviewee 1, representative of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles). 
A side effect of this learning on the part of EU officials seems to be the recognition of a new 
central place  for migration policy in debates on EU integration: 
‘Migration concern was always seen as a side dish way down in the list of priorities... Today, 
immigration policy is in the centre. It’s part and parcel of the EU policy’ (Interviewee 2, EU policy-
making official). 
‘Migration is one of the key priorities for the EU integration. It will be for a long time, considering 
climate change, external instability, etc’ (Interviewee 5, EC official). 
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This new central place of migration is confirmed by the focus of the new modes of integration 
explained below: 
‘There is a need for a new vision. There is a job to be done in terms of helping people understand 
why the EU matters. The post-war peace project is losing ground, so what’s the project now?’ 
(Interviewee 6, MEP). 
The evidence above highlights weaknesses in EU integration. Seabrooke and Tsingou (2018) fear 
the existence of the EU project is threatened now. However, none of the interviewees expressed 
such a pessimistic view about EU prospects. Crises do challenge integration (Wold and 
Ossewaarde 2018). This seems to illustrate double-loop learning since the fundamental 
behaviours and structures of the EU have been reconsidered and have started changing, such as 
putting migration at the centre of policy-making. The evident intensive learning through which 
integration has been happening after the migrant crisis may serve as a self-correction mechanism 
in the EU to adapt its integration and respond to the arising challenges. A more detailed picture 
of this is presented in the next section. This also borders with triple-loop learning as there are 
traces of fundamental change of what the vision for the EU future is – what is right for it to do 
and why it exists at all. However, given Tosey et al’s (2012) critique of theoretical and empirical 
credibility of the concept ‘triple-loop learning’, we can only speculate whether it does take place 
or what we observe is still within the boundaries of double-loop learning. 
4.3. Modes of EU integration driven by learning 
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Our interview data suggest that the EU has been learning the following modes of integration after 
the migrant crisis: questioning further enlargement, dealing with succession after Brexit, and 
leaning towards differentiated integration amongst its remaining MSs. 
4.3.1. Shaping the relationships with candidate countries: questioning further enlargement 
There are six candidate countries for a potential fifth wave of EU enlargement: Turkey, FYROM, 
Macedonia, Albania, Serbia and Iceland. Negotiations with Iceland have been put on hold at the 
request of the Icelandic government. Turkey’s candidacy is also on hold.  As the Communication 
on EU Enlargement Policy (2018) states ‘Accession candidates must give the rule of law, justice 
and fundamental rights utmost priority in the negotiations. This rules out EU membership for 
Turkey for the foreseeable future. Turkey has been taking giant strides away from the European 
Union for some time’. 
The people working in the EU institutions seem to question whether it makes sense to enlarge to 
the other candidate countries any time soon and whether it is worth to enlarge at all. The 
interviewees suggest that the policy-makers are unanimous in this. It is a very strong theme in 
the interviews, illustrated by the following quote of a MEP, referring to the speech by Jean-Claude 
Juncker State of the Union Address 2017 (European Commission Press Release Database 2018): 
‘…the president of the European Commission said that there would be no enlargement during this 
period. There are many political negotiations but the enlargement to Serbia or FYROM or any 
other country is not a political reality just now’ (Interviewee 3). 
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Hesitation as to further enlargement is linked in some of the interviews to the difficulty of the 
recent negotiations about how to redistribute migrants and how to manage national borders 
during and after the migrant crisis. The MEP, mentioned above, states: 
‘…nobody is interested in bringing new actors in this process. The process with 28 Member States 
is already absolutely complicated because everybody says we have some national specifics, far-
right parties... It’s all difficult but still possible’ (Interviewee 3).  
This sentiment that enlargement is not a priority for the EU in the near future can be traced in 
the documents that have been issued by the EU following the interviews. The language is 
somewhat softer in the 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. This states, ‘It is clear 
that there will be no further enlargement during the mandate of this Commission and this 
Parliament. No candidate is ready. But thereafter the European Union will be greater than 27 in 
number’. Hence the prospect of further enlargement is not foreclosed but possibly implicitly 
placed in a queue after two other priorities: dealing with succession after Brexit and 
reconstructing the relationships among the remaining MSs.  
4.3.2. Shaping the relationships with exiting members: UK-EU 
Mixed flows of migration became a fertile ground for conflation and misrepresentation of 
different types of migration in the UK Leave Campaign leading up to the June 2016 Referendum 
on the UK’s membership of the EU (Sayer 2017: 99).  
The lessons learnt by the EU from the migrant crisis that are driving the reshaping of its 
relationship with the exiting UK are related to the UK itself as well as other MSs to prevent them 
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from exiting. In the withdrawal negotiations, which are on-going at the time of writing, both the 
EU and the UK have been struggling to define and agree on what their relationship will look like 
after Brexit. These disagreements on the EU’s side are in part an expression of a dilemma that 
the EU faces in establishing its new integration mode – shaping the relationships with 
(potentially) exiting members such as the UK. It requires a redefinition of a range of aspects of 
EU policy: on the one hand, the EU wants to retain a close cooperation relation with the UK in 
part by granting privileged status to it in some respects, and on the other hand, it does not want 
to allow the UK to cherry-pick so as to preserve the coherence of the EU acquis.  
Our interviews with EU policy-makers suggest that they would favour for the EU as an institution 
to retain some aspects of the close cooperation with the UK post- Brexit because the UK is an 
important strategic cog in the EU machine. The UK’s role in EU security is an example: 
‘The UK is an extremely important player when it comes to the international security of the EU. 
Since Brexit is happening, we hope that the UK will remain in security agencies such as Europol. It 
wouldn’t be a good decision to stop participating in such agencies and cooperating with other 
Member States on the multilateral level in security. It has already been mentioned by the UK 
authorities that they would remain in Europol at least’ (Interviewee 14, official working on 
Strategy ‘European Migrant Smuggling Centre’ at Europol). 
The interviewees favor this close cooperation on security grounds despite its intent of not 
granting privileges to exiting members so as to discourage further exits: 
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‘If you want to get out, like the UK, you get out… It depends on what Theresa May wants to do. 
Europe sticks to its principles. This is Europe… These are the rules of the club... If you are not very 
receptive and can’t change anything, you have to leave the club’ (Interviewee 4, EU official). 
Indeed, there is a degree of fear in the EU that any ‘cherry-picking’ in terms of retaining some 
privileges for the UK post-Brexit may encourage other MSs to follow the UK’s path. Brexit has 
had a very limited impact so far, however, on party politics of other MSs (Taggart and Szczerbiak 
2018), perhaps in part because of how challenging it is proving to find a deal which garners 
support from the UK parliament. The debate about the deal is complicated but, in a nutshell, it is 
about the choice between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Brexit. ‘Hard Brexit refers to the position of leaving 
the EU’s Single Market. Soft Brexit refers to staying in the EU’s Single Market and Customs Union’ 
(Hobolt 2018: 3). The disagreements exist not only between the EU and the UK but also within 
the EU and the UK (Hobolt 2018). A possible no-deal Brexit is discussed by Fahy et al (2017) as 
the ‘hardest’ version of Brexit. The challenges in Brexit negotiations may also, supposedly, be 
attributed to a possible hidden agenda of both parties in using the challenges as an argument to 
eventually retain UK’s membership in the EU by avoiding Brexit. This is a speculation but it was 
also implied by a MEP: 
‘Maybe it’s a reality that we will have a new referendum on Brexit. Many of my colleagues in the 
EP say that maybe it could be a solution. It would be good for the EU, for the UK.’ (Interviewee 3). 
4.3.3. Shaping the relationships among the remaining Member States:           
differentiated integration 
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The third integration mode the EU has been learning after the migrant crisis focuses on 
differentiated integration as the way to shape relationships among the remaining MSs. The 
discussion of further enlargement prospects and the EU-UK case above already evidence a 
propensity towards differentiated integration. The latter has become more broadly the preferred 
mode for further integration of the remaining MSs.  
A similar issue has recently been addressed by Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2017) when 
examining the distinction between market integration and core state powers integration in the 
EU. They argue that the Eurozone and the migrant crisis ‘made horizontal differentiation 
unattractive, re-regulation ineffective, centralized risk and burden-sharing unfeasible, and the 
externalization and adjustment burdens to non-EU action necessary by default’ (p.178). The 
authors also apply these ideas to the analysis of the five escape scenarios from these challenges 
that were suggested in the 2017 European Commission’s ‘White Paper on the Future of Europe’: 
1) ‘carry on’ and tackle problems as they arise; 2) ‘nothing but the Single Market’ which 
presupposes abandoning the idea to integrate only core state powers; 3) ‘more horizontal 
differentiation: closer integration among those MSs ‘who want more’’; 4) ‘doing less more 
efficiently’ by focusing only on a few most important policy areas and re-nationalise all others; 5) 
‘doing much more together’ by focusing on EU capacity-building in core state powers and 
avoiding the re-nationalization of any policy areas (p.191-192).   
Our data suggest that these scenarios may not be equally plausible alternatives. Carrying on 
seems to be the least favoured option because it would perpetuate the problems, according to 
the interviewees. Instead, a combination of scenarios five and three seems the priority of EU 
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officials for the future – the securitisation of the EU, and considering the reform of the EU into a 
two-tier region. EU securitisation is an example of ‘doing much more’, while considering a two-
tier EU illustrates a horizontal differentiation:  two-tier means that the core and peripheral 
countries would have different levels of commitment to the common EU principles, and would 
also benefit unequally from the privileges that EU membership offers. The concern about various 
types of divisions in the EU has been heightened following the migrant crisis: 
‘The lack of solidarity in the EU has been noted by Western European countries. There will be an 
interesting development in this direction… The EU would move on with a two-tier approach… This 
would be the difference between those countries that want more integration in terms of 
economical and tax harmonisation, migration, and some countries that want to stay behind. It 
would be their choice not to move forward. This would have consequences for financial solidarity. 
At the moment, these are only words, but it may happen. This development has been in the 
documents for some years but it’s more valid now’ (Interviewee 5, EC official). 
Some interviewees however, expressed a deep concern about a potential negative impact of this 
plan on the EU as an institution: 
‘I am worried that we will have deepening integration without some Member States… It would be 
the end of the European dream if you have a centre with 15 or so countries in the Eurozone, and 
all other countries on the outside. There will be bad consequences for many countries… Since we 
are not able to bring all these countries together, then the EU in today’s form is over’ (Interviewee 
3, MEP). 
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All the complexity of rebuilding the EU into two tiers and the time it would involve triggers the 
necessity to search for what may sustain what is left from the solidarity and strengthen it for the 
time being. The migrant crisis evidences that the fear for the borders is this joining factor, and 
the response of the EU is supporting securitization. It involves working out mechanisms to protect 
the EU from external terrorism, as well as preventing the radicalisation of the citizens in the EU. 
This is ensured by the security services of the EU through cooperation among the MSs and, more 
importantly, through cooperation with the neighbouring countries of the EU: 
‘There is cooperation with third countries, counter-terrorism dialogue with countries of origin, 
countries of passage, countries at the borders of the EU. All of this can play an important role in 
preventing the movement in the first place… There is cooperation with countries along the route, 
with Turkey in particular, countries in the Western Balkans… There are countries that are so close 
to the EU that the effective use of our internal instruments there can help to protect the security 
of the EU… Security is the foundation. We have already involved the Ministers of Education, of 
Healthcare, etc’ (Interviewee 8, EU official in the internal security domain).  
The same EU official in the internal security domain further explains how the promotion of local 
level democracy in the EU states facilitates security in the EU overall: 
‘The quality of democracy on the local level matters…All of this needs to come together in reality. 
And reality is the street, the school, the family. That’s the world where security happens or fails 
to happen… It’s about having trust in oneself, believing that the other one trusts you, trusting the 
rule of law, the state, the objectivity and the effectiveness of the institutions, trusting that if you 
do anything illegal, you will be in trouble, that there are boundaries’.  
23 
 
This suggests that differentiated integration may be emerging as a trajectory in terms of both 
membership and a different extent of cooperation in various policy areas.  
  5. Discussion and conclusion  
 
The perspectives of those we interviewed and supporting data from policy document analysis 
show an important link of EU integration modes after the migrant crisis to learning, which seems 
to have been overlooked in the literature about the relationship between crises and integration. 
The migrant crisis served as a ‘tipping point’ (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013) in EU learning. It 
triggered intensive learning through, on the one hand, retrospective reflection on the past 
achievements and faults of integration. A result of this has been a shift in the position of 
migration from the periphery to the centre of EU policy making. On the other hand, learning has 
also occurred through prospective thinking on the possible future course of integration. In this 
respect, post-migrant crisis learning has yielded new mixed modes of integration. The learning 
we evidenced gravitates towards double-loop learning (Argyris and Schon 1978) – the 
transformation of fundamental behaviours of the organisation. Traces of triple-loop learning may 
be seen in the reconsideration of the vision of the EU as a peace-maker which does not work 
anymore and the need to find a new vision. However, because of Tosey et al’s (2012) critique of 
theoretical and empirical credibility of the concept ‘triple-loop learning’, we can only speculate 
whether triple-loop learning does take place. We also found an example of single-loop learning, 
which is instrumental and does not involve fundamentally challenging organisational structure 
and behaviour (Argyris and Schon 1978), in the case of securitization. 
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Applying the learning lens demonstrates the limits of the definition of EU integration as widening 
and deepening. This finding is in line with the literature operating with the term ‘differentiated 
integration’ (e.g.  Heiskala and Aro 2018;  Antoniolli 2019). An original aspect of our findings here 
is on the prospects of enlargement. While widening through further enlargement is still debated, 
it has been put on hold for the foreseeable future because of the problems that arose with the 
current MSs. Attention is now on coordinating the relationships with the candidate countries 
rather than on affirming membership. As to deepening, some scholars, such as Heiskala and Aro 
(2018), still use the term when they refer to how the EU regulates relationships among its MSs. 
However, our findings about the emerging preference for differentiated integration suggest that 
the term ‘deepening’ may no longer express the prospects of the relation between the EU and 
its MSs. Other than with regard to securitisation, the differentiated integration trajectory that 
our findings point to may offer a more realistic image of cooperation among different groups of 
MSs. Particularly important here is that the widening and deepening terminology does not seem 
to capture the new integration mode evidenced by the shaping of the relationship between the 
EU and its exiting MS – the UK. Choices as to the retained level of integration in this respect are 
driven by a tension between the objective of reaching a mutually beneficial deal and the objective 
of giving a clear message to other MSs that leaving the EU results in loss of membership 
privileges.  
 
The article strengthens the connection between the literature on EU organisational learning and 
that on EU integration. It shows that novel emerging modes of EU integration after the migrant 
crisis offer a telling case study in organisational learning. Moreover, the notion of learning 
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provides both an important reading key for existing integration theories, and a conceptual tool 
to further theorize integration. Our findings are a first step towards recognizing EU’s learning in 
its integration modes in the post-migrant crisis context. Since the project from which this article 
emerged did not set out to investigate learning per se, further research is needed with a research 
design specifically focused around learning to further our findings.. 
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Appendix: list of interviewees  
Code Described as: 
1 Representative of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
2 EU official  
3 MEP  
4 EU official  
5 EC official 
6 MEP 
7 EU official  
8 EU official in the internal security domain  
9 EC  official  
10 EU official  
11 EC  official 
12 EC official  
13  EC  official  
14 Official working on Strategy ‘European Migrant Smuggling Centre’ at Europol 
15 Representative of the European Citizen Action Service  
16 Policy Analyst  
 
Figure 1: Locating our research in the existing literature 
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